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IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
The appellant in this matter is M.R.,1 by and through his guardian, Cynthia F. 
Casey. The underlying criminal case that presented the issues M.R. raises on appeal is 
State of Utah v. Patrick William Casey. 
1
 Because M.R. is a juvenile victim of a sexual assault, he will be referred to in 
this brief by initials only or as "the victim." We respectfully request that the Court and 
the other parties likewise refer to him only by his initials. 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction of the Court is one of the issues presented by this appeal. See Part IV, 
infra. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court because the Court of Appeals has certified the 
case, pursuant to Rule 43(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as a case of 
potentially far-reaching importance (R. 325). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
All of the issues presented in this case are legal issues of first impression, which 
are subject to de novo review on appeal. See generally State v. Penay 869 P.2d 932, 938 
(Utah 1994). 
1. Whether the victim of a first degree felony sexual offense was entitled to be 
heard before the trial court accepted a plea bargain to a misdemeanor offense under the 
Victims' Rights Amendment, Utah Const., art. I, § 28(l)(b). 
2. Whether the district court erred in declining to grant a misplea upon proper 
motion by crime victim where the victim's constitutional right to be heard at the plea 
hearing was violated and the motion for misplea was made promptly. 
3. Whether the district court erred in failing to consider whether the proposed plea 
bargain was in the public interest. 
4. Whether a crime victim is entitled to appellate review of a trial court's denial of 
an attempt to assert a constitutional right. 
1 
5. Whether a crime victim is entitled to be heard through counsel when attempting 
to assert a constitutional right. 
All of these issues were properly preserved below, by means of a specific 
objection to the district court's rulings on these issues (R. 312-15). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following relevant provisions are found in Addendum A: Utah Const., art. I, § 
28; Utah Const., art. I, § 11; Utah Const., art. VIII, § 5; Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4; Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38-11; Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
On November 3, 1999, the Tooele County Attorney's Office filed a criminal 
information charging defendant/appellee Patrick Casey with aggravated sexual abuse of a 
child in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(3), a first degree felony charge (R. 
004). A preliminary hearing was held in the spring, where the victim, M.R, and his 
mother and legal guardian, Cynthia F. Casey, both testified. The case was bound over for 
trial, which was set for October 24, 2000. 
Following the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor handling the case - Deputy 
Tooele County Attorney Alan Jeppesen - met with M.R. and Ms. Casey and told them 
that they had made good witnesses (R. 124). A few weeks later, Ms. Casey, along with 
her 25-year-old daughter Angela Staples, met with Mr. Jeppesen and explained that the 
1
 The trial court denied the victim's motion for a misplea without holding an 
evidentiary hearing, essentially because the victim had failed to state a claim (R. 327:45). 
As a result, all facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the victim as the non-
moving party. See Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, \ 2, 20 P.3d 895, 897. 
2 
defendant had sexually abused three of her other children for almost a decade. She 
provided details about defendant Casey's abuse of these other children, explaining that he 
was a predatory pedophile (R. 123). At this point, Mr. Jeppesen indicated that, in view of 
strong evidence of guilt and defendant Casey's repeated acts of sexual abuse, the case 
would not be plea bargained (R. 123). 
Shortly before trial, without notice to or discussion with the victim or his family, 
Mr. Jeppesen offered to let defendant Casey plead to a Class A misdemeanor. The 
victim's family learned of this offer only because Ms. Casey repeatedly called Mr. 
Jeppesen about attending the pretrial hearing, finally managing to get through to him (R. 
123). When she learned of the offer, Ms. Casey immediately stated her strong opposition. 
Mr. Jeppesen indicated that maybe the defendant would not accept the plea (R. 123). The 
defendant, however, did accept the plea, a fact that Ms. Casey learned only through 
additional, repeated attempts to reach Mr. Jeppesen (R. 123). Ms. Casey again strongly 
objected to the plea and explained her desire to urge the court not to accept it (R. 122). 
On October 24, 2000, the district court (Judge David Young) held a change of plea 
hearing. M.R., Ms. Casey, and other family members attended the hearing. Despite the 
victim's clear and repeated objections, the prosecutor did not alert the court to the 
victim's objections or his wish to make a statement (R. 122). During a recess in the 
hearing, the victim's family again strenuously explained to Mr. Jeppesen their objections 
to the plea (R. 122). Mr. Jeppensen responded that crime victims were not his clients, 
that he had done the plea, and that it was his decision to make (R. 122). Following the 
3 
recess, Mr. Jeppesen again refused to inform the court of the victim's desire to speak. 
The trial court initially expressed its surprise at the "dramatic change" in the 
seriousness of the charges (R. 327:5) and its concern about a stipulated sentence of four 
months (R. 327:7-8). After parties agreed to remove the stipulated sentence, the court 
accepted the plea and set the matter for sentencing (R. 327:18). 
Ms. Casey then immediately sought legal assistance, contacting undersigned 
counsel (R. 122). Undersigned counsel agreed to represent the victim on a pro bono basis 
and alerted the prosecutor's office to the violation of the victim's rights (R. 136). Mr. 
Jeppessen responded with a letter of apology, explaining that: "To be honest, I did not 
recall that the victim had right to speak at the hearing where the plea was taken by the 
Court.. . . I will certainly make every effort to so inform the victims of future cases 
prosecuted in the Tooele County Attorney's office, and offer my apology to your client" 
(R. 127). The letter concluded: "In an effort to accommodate your client, the State and 
the Defendant suggest that we move the Court to reopen the hearing so as to allow the 
victim's mother an opportunity to address the Court regarding the plea agreement" (R. 
127). 
Following this suggestion, on November 2, 2000, the victim filed a motion for a 
misplea and a motion for the court to reject the plea bargain (R. 140, 142, 152). In 
response, Mr. Jeppesen retracted his earlier offer of reopening the hearing and filed a 
motion to strike all of the victim's pleadings (R. 283). He argued that he did not 
"deliberately and intentionally" deny the victim's right to be heard before the plea was 
4 
accepted (R. 283). Rather, "it was an oversight on his part that the victim was unable to 
address the Court that day" (R. 282). Nonetheless, he opposed the motion for the misplea 
(R. 281-83). The defendant likewise objected to reopening the plea (R. 100). 
On November 27, 2000, the trial court held a sentencing hearing (R. 328). 
Reserving ruling on the defendant's and state's objections that the victim lacked standing 
to be heard, the court heard from the victim and his mother, who both objected to the plea 
(R. 328:9-18). Counsel for the victim then attempted to present legal arguments in 
support of the victim's position (R. 328:18). The court questioned whether the victim 
was entitled to have counsel present such arguments (R. 328:18-20), but (without ruling 
on the matter) allowed counsel to make a statement (R. 328:20-36). The district court 
then stated that it would "informally reopen the plea for the purposes of hearing that 
testimony [from the victim and his mother] . . . and the Court will also accept the 
testimony certainly now . . . as it has been rendered in respect to sentencing" (R. 328:45 
(emphasis added)). The court continued: "The Court finds that the prosecutor should 
have, does have, and did in this case, exercise discretion in his negotiations with the 
defense attorney. They entered into that agreement with sound legal considerations that 
they alone basically negotiated and knew together and on that basis, the Court accepts and 
reaffirms the plea on that Class A level and denies any request to the contrary" (R. 
328:45).2 
At this point, counsel for the victim stood to attempt to note the victim's objection 
2
 The district court s brief statement is set forth in full in Addendum B. 
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to the court's conclusions. The court refused to hear any objections, stating "I don't wish 
to grant you further opportunity to respond" (R. 328:46). Counsel for the victim then 
requested an opportunity to provide a later, written proffer of objections. The court 
granted this request (R. 328:46), and counsel later filed detailed objections (R. 315). 
The court then turned to sentencing. The court heard sentencing arguments from 
defense counsel (R. 328:46), Mr. Jeppesen (R. 328:50), and the defendant (R. 328:51). 
The court then began to impose sentence. Counsel for the victim, however, interjected to 
remind the court of the victim's right to make an impact statement before sentence was 
imposed (R. 328:51-52). The court then heard from Ms. Casey (R. 328:52-53) and 
sentenced the defendant on the Class A misdemeanor to eight months in jail (R. 328: 54). 
On December 6, 2000, the victim filed in the district court a notice of appeal from 
the court's ruling (R. 320). The victim thereafter filed a docketing statement in the Court 
of Appeals, along with a suggestion of certification to the Supreme Court. The State 
concurred with the certification, while the defendant did not. On January 19, 2001, the 
Court of Appeals certified this appeal to the Supreme Court, concluding that regardless of 
the outcome of the appeal "a petition for writ of certiorari would likely be filed and 
granted and resolution of the case has potentially broad-reaching impact" (R. 325). 
On December 22, 2000, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The 
victim filed a response. By order entered February 13, 2001, this Court deferred ruling on 
defendant's motion for summary dismissal and directed the parties "to brief their issues 
6 
for plenary review and to proceed to the next stage in the appellate process."3 
SPECIAL RULE REQUIRING THE COURT TO DECIDE ALL 
PROPERLY PRESENTED CRIME VICTIMS' ISSUES 
As this is the first crime victim's appeal to reach Utah's appellate courts, the Court 
should be aware of a special rule governing crime victims appeals. The legislature has 
specifically directed that "[a]n appellate court shall review all such properly presented 
[crime victims'] issues, including issues that are capable of repetition but would 
otherwise evade review." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(c) (emphasis added). The 
apparent intent of the legislature was to develop a body of appellate law protecting the 
rights of crime victims, recognizing that crime victims appeals would, for practical 
reasons, be few and far between. As a result, the Court is obligated to decide all issues 
properly presented in this appeal and render a ruling on therr|. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. A victim of a crime has a constitutionally protected right to be heard before any 
plea bargain is accepted. Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1 )(b). That right was violated in this 
case when the prosecutor refused to bring the victim's strenuous and repeated objections 
to the attention of the court. 
II. The proper remedy for violation of a victim's right to be heard before 
acceptance of a plea bargain is the declaration of a misplea #nd a new plea hearing at 
3
 One last point may be relevant: On January 16, 2001, Mr. Jeppesen resigned his 
prosecuting position, citing unfair "public perceptions" resulting from this case. Mary 
Ruth Hammond, Under Fire, Jeppesen Resigns Attorney Post: With Victims in Mind, 
Ahlstrom Restructures Office, Tooele County Transcript-Bulletin, Jan. 18, 2001, at 1. 
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which the victim's right is honored. The misplea remedy has been recognized in State v. 
Kay, 111 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986), where this Court suggested that a plea could be set aside 
to protect the "legitimate expectations of . . . the public . . . ." Id. at 1305. As recognized 
in Kay and other cases, the prohibition against double jeopardy does not prevent 
declaration of a misplea. Nor does the "no benefits for defendants provision" - codified 
in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12(2) — prevent declaration of a misplea at the request of 
the victim. Indeed, were the Court to construe this statute as blocking a misplea, the 
statute would be unconstitutional under the Victims' Rights Amendment, Utah Const., art. 
I, § 28(l)(a), and the Open Courts Clause, Utah Const., art. I, § 11. The court below erred 
in not granting the victim's motion for a misplea. 
III. The proper standard for a trial court to apply in determining whether to accept 
a proposed plea bargain is whether the plea is in the public interest. This case should be 
remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the reduction of the defendant's 
charges from a first degree felony to a Class A misdemeanor is in the public interest. 
IV. A crime victim can seek appellate review of a violation of his rights. The 
right of appeal stems from a specific provision authorizing victim appeals, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(b), as well as constitutional guarantees found in the Right to Appeal 
Clause, Utah Const., art. VIII, § 5; the Open Courts Clause, Utah Const., art. I, § 11; and 
the Crime Victim's Right to Fairness, Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1 )(a). 
V. A crime victim has the right to be heard through counsel on legal issues 
directly pertaining to victims' rights. 
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ARGUMENT 
Since the earliest days of our nation, it has been settled law that "where there is a 
legal right, there is also a legal remedy . . . ." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) 
(internal quotation omitted). This appeal presents the issue of whether this settled law 
applies to crime victims. In this case, the state plainly violated the victim's constitutional 
right to be heard before the acceptance of the plea bargain. See Utah Const., art. I, § 
28(1 )(b). Yet the state, the defendant, and ultimately the trial judge all took the view that 
nothing could be done to remedy that violation. If that view is upheld on appeal, solemn 
constitutional commitments made to crime victims will be converted into meaningless 
paper promises. 
This Court should reverse the trial court and provide an effective remedy for 
violations of victims' rights. The appropriate remedy in this case is clear: the Court 
should declare a misplea and remand for a new hearing at which the trial court will make 
a de novo determination whether to accept the proposed plea between the state and the 
defendant after hearing from the victim. That exact remedy would be available to either 
the state or the defendant in the event that their substantive rights were violated at a plea 
hearing. The constitutional rights of crime victims deserve no less respect. 
I. M.R.'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD BEFORE 
APPROVAL OF ANY PLEA BARGAIN WAS VIOLATED. 
A. The Victims' Rights Amendment Guarantees Victims the Right to be 
Heard Before Any Plea Is Accepted. 
M.R. had a constitutionally protected right to be heard before the district court 
9 
decided whether to accept the proposed plea bargain between the state and the defendant. 
That right is found in the Victims' Rights Amendment, enshrined in our state constitution 
in 1994. Among the most important provisions in that amendment is the guarantee that 
crime victims have the right "to be heard at important criminal justice hearings related to 
the victim . . . ." Utah Const., art. I, § 28(l)(b). The "important criminal justice hearings" 
at which the victim has a right to be heard include "any court proceeding involving the 
disposition of charges against a defendant. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(5)(c); § 77-
38-4(1). Thus, M.R. had the right "to be heard" before the court approved a plea bargain 
in which a serious felony charge against the defendant was dismissed. As the drafters of 
the Utah provision have noted: 
The right to be heard also extends to any proceeding involving a 
negotiated plea. Under the present rules of procedure, every agreement 
between a defendant and the state to resolve a case before trial must be 
submitted to the trial court for approval. If the court believes that the 
agreement is not in the interest of justice, the court may reject it. 
Unfortunately, victims have not had an opportunity to present their views on 
the propriety of plea agreements. Indeed, it may be that keeping the victim 
away from the judge is one of the prime motivations for plea bargaining. 
Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah's 
Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 1373, 1394 (internal quotation omitted).4 
The right of victims in Utah to be heard before acceptance of a plea parallels the law in 
4
 Senator Craig A. Peterson and Representative R. Lee Ellertson, the legislative 
sponsors of the Victims' Rights Amendment, specifically endorsed this article as "a 
statement of the drafters' intention." 1994 Utah L. Rev. at 1373 n.*. Accordingly, at 
various points in this brief, we will cite this article as evidence of what the drafters of the 
Victims' Rights Amendment intended. 
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most states. See Douglas E. Beloof, Victims in Criminal Procedure 462 (1999). 
While the constitutional amendment by itself is sufficient to establish M.R.'s right 
to be heard before a plea was accepted, that right is bolstered in a series of statutes and 
other provisions. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-3(b), gives victims, "including 
children and their guardians," the right "to be informed and assisted as to their role in the 
criminal justice process." Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-3(c) gives victims the right to "clear 
explanations regarding relevant legal proceedings . . . ." These provisions also obligate 
the prosecutor, as a "criminal justice agency," to provide the specific "assistance" and 
"explanations." To further ensure that victims are treated fairly in the plea bargaining 
process, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-601(6), requires the prosecutor, 
"at the time of the entry of the plea," to "represent to the court, either in writing or on the 
record, that the victim has been contacted and an explanation of the plea has been 
provided" before any plea is accepted. As a final guarantee of fair treatment for victims, 
the Utah Constitution, art. I, § 28(1 )(a), gives victims the right to be treated with 
"fairness, dignity, and respect." 
Under all of these provisions, it is quite clear that a victim of a crime enjoys the 
right to be heard before the court accepts any plea. In spite of these clear mandates, in the 
trial court the Tooele County Attorney's Office ultimately took the contrived position that 
the victim has a right to be heard only after the court has accepted the plea (R. 281-82). 
This absurd view would render the victim's statement on the plea meaningless — 
5
 The statutes we have located on this point are collected in Addendum C. 
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transforming it from a right important enough to be enshrined in the state constitution to 
an irrelevant, after-the-fact commentary on the court's completed decision. The Utah 
Constitution explicitly provides that the victim has the right "to be heard at important 
criminal justice hearings related to the victim . . . ." Utah Const., art. I, § 28(l)(b) 
(emphasis added). This constitutional right obviously mandates that victims be "heard" 
when their statements make a difference — not when their statements are pointless. See 
Utah Voter Information Pamphlet, General Election, Nov. 8, 1994 at 9 ("As a result [of 
victims speaking], the court will have the benefit of relevant information from the 
victim."); Cassell, supra, 1994 Utah L. Rev. at 1394 ("no plea agreement should be 
accepted without first giving the victim the opportunity to express a view on the 
defendant's disposition") (emphasis added). 
B. M.R.'s Right to be Heard Was Violated in this Case. 
Although M.R. had a constitutionally protected right to be heard before the district 
court accepted any plea, he was denied that right. Although M.R., through his guardian, 
raised a strenuous objection to the proposed plea with the prosecutor, the prosecutor 
declined to bring that information to the attention of the court.6 Moreover, even though 
the victim's family was seated in the courtroom during the change of plea hearing, they 
were never given the opportunity to address the court. Several days later, the prosecutor 
"did not recall" that the victim had that right and offered his "apology" for his failure. (R. 
6
 In the court below, Mr. Jeppesen claimed that he had informed the court of the 
victim's objection (R. 282). Now that the transcript of the October 24 hearing is 
available, it is clear that Mr. Jeppesen's representations were simply false. 
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127). 
The record is thus undisputed that the victim was never heard before the district 
court approved the plea. What may be unclear is whether the blame for the lack of an 
opportunity to be heard should be assessed to the prosecutor or the district judge. 
Certainly the prosecutor could have easily avoided the problem by alerting the judge of 
the victim's interest in being heard.7 At the same time, the judge could have simply 
inquired whether the victim was present and, if so, whether the victim wished to make a 
statement. It is interesting that Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure contains 
an elaborate list of inquiries that the court must make of the defendant before any plea is 
accepted. See Utah R. Crim. Pro. 11(e)(1) to (e)(8). Yet Rule 11 contains not even a 
single inquiry concerning crime victims.8 
In light of this uncertainty about the ultimate responsibility for insuring 
compliance with victims' rights, the defendant or the state may make the hypertechnical 
argument that M.R. was never denied his right to be heard because he could have stood 
up in the middle of the plea proceedings to express his views. Such an argument would 
7
 We have been informed that, in the wake of this case, the Tooele County 
Attorney's Office has now adopted an internal policy requiring its prosecutors to inform 
the court when a victim wishes to speak. 
8
 As part of its disposition in this case, we urge this Court to send to its Advisory 
Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure the mandate to redraft Rule 11 so that an 
inquiry concerning compliance with victim's rights becomes part of the Rule 11 plea 
process. Trial courts could simply be instructed to inquire of prosecutors whether the 
victim had been advised of the proposed plea and whether the victim wished to make a 
statement concerning it. We have been informed that many judges throughout Utah 
currently follow such a practice. Other states have adopted similar rules. See, e.g., Ind. 
Code § 35-35-3-2; Oregon Rev. St. § 135.406; S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-7-9; Texas. 
Code Crim. Pro. 26.13. 
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never fly in connection with a defendant's right to be heard on the plea bargain. To the 
contrary, the trial court must make affirmative inquiries of a defendant before accepting 
any plea, see, e.g., State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372-73 (Utah 1996) (trial courts must 
personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and 
establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional 
rights), a requirement with which trial courts must "strictly comply," see, e.g., State v. 
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, <f 11, 983 P.2d 556, 558. Moreover, such an argument would 
ignore the obvious reality that virtually all crime victims are (as in this case) 
unrepresented by legal counsel when the court considers a plea bargain. They thus lack 
the legal acumen to insert themselves into a hearing without invitation by the court. The 
trial court in this case recognized this reality, noting the victim and his guardian were "not 
trained in the law" (R. 328:18). This Court likewise should not blind itself to the reality 
that victims of crime do not know the proper procedural devices for asserting their rights. 
Victims look to the state - through its prosecutors and judges - to protect their right to be 
heard. Mr. Jeppesen was told specifically that the victims wished to make a statement, 
and he refused to provide that information to the court. There can be no doubt that, as a 
Deputy County Prosecutor, this action constituted state action that deprived the victim of 
his right to be heard.9 
9
 Were the Court to nevertheless reject our argument and hold that M.R. and his 
mother somehow forfeited their right to be heard by not jumping up and speaking in the 
plea proceeding below, the results could be chaotic. In particular, such a holding would 
likely lead to the Utah Council on Crime Victims informing crime victims throughout the 
state that they would risk forfeiting their constitutional right to be heard, Utah Const., art. 
I, § 28(1 )(b), unless they forcefully injected themselves in the middle of court 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE A MISPLEA 
TO REMEDY THE VIOLATION OF THE VICTIM'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO BE HEARD BEFORE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLEA. 
In light of the clear denial of the victim's constitutional right to be heard before the 
plea was accepted, the next question that arose below was one of remedy. In the district 
court, the defendant and the state took the position that the victim has no remedy for this 
violation of his right, even though the violation was discovered and reported to the 
prosecutor and defendant within a few days of the court's acceptance of the plea. In their 
view, the victim simply had to live with the violation of his rights. 
This view would conflict, of course, with the long settled law that "where there is a 
legal right, there is also a legal remedy . . .." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) 
(internal quotation omitted). This section explains why a "misplea" is the appropriate 
remedy when the victim is denied the right to be heard before a plea is accepted. 
A. The Proper Remedy for Violation of a Victim's Right to be Heard 
Before Acceptance of a Plea is a Misplea. 
The straightforward remedy for a violation of a victim's right to be heard at a plea 
hearing is a new plea hearing - in other words, a declaration of a "misplea" that simply 
moves the state, the defendant, and the victim back to where they would have been 
proceedings. Victims have the right to be heard at, inter alia, bail hearings, plea hearings, 
and sentencing hearings. Many victims, unschooled in legal issues, would then begin 
vocally attempting to assert themselves in such hearings without invitation from judges or 
prosecutors, creating unnecessary tension between courts and victims, burdening the 
courts with potentially irrelevant information, and even potentially creating mistrials if 
victims improperly spoke in front of juries. Clearly, the better course is for this Court to 
conclude that, as a practical matter, M.R. was denied his right to be heard. 
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without a violation of victim's rights.10 So straightforward is this remedy that, in its letter 
of apology, the Tooele County Attorney's Office initially proposed to "reopen the 
hearing" to allow the victim's mother to speak regarding the plea agreement" (R. 127). 
Precisely this procedure is recognized in Utah case law. The cases are legion in 
which the courts have set aside a plea bargain when defendant's rights are violated. See, 
e.g., State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996). But perhaps even more analogous are 
cases in which the prosecution has been able to obtain a misplea because of violation of 
its right to fair treatment in the plea process. The best illustration of the misplea 
procedure is State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986). In Kay, the prosecutor and 
defendant agreed to a plea bargain, in which the defendant would be sentenced to life 
imprisonment rather than the death penalty. Following the court's acceptance of this deal, 
the local community was outraged over the perceived leniency of the plea. See id. at 1297 
(noting public demonstrations against the plea). The state then moved to have the plea 
vacated, and the trial court agreed. See id. This Court affirmed the trial court's decision 
to vacate the plea. Justice Zimmerman's opinion for the Court11 held that a misplea was 
10
 To be clear, the misplea we proposed would have had the trial court set aside 
the prosecution's dismissal of the first degree felony charges, presumably followed by the 
defendant's decision to withdraw his guilty plea to a misdemeanor. See Part II.C, infra 
(explaining misplea procedure in more detail). 
11
 Justice Zimmerman's opinion was joined by Justice Durham; Justice Stewart 
concurred in the result and joined Parts I and II; Justice Howe concurred in the result and 
indicated that he "agree[d] with much of the 'misplea' analysis of the majority." Chief 
Justice Hall concurred in the result. Subsequent opinions of Utah appellate courts have 
viewed Justice Zimmerman's opinion as stating the law. See, e.g., State v. Moss, 921 
P.2d 1021,1024 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App. 4, f 24, 17 P.3d 
1145,1151. 
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appropriate in various circumstances: 
Therefore, it seems plain that a misplea can properly be granted where 
obvious reversible error has been committed in connection with the terms or 
the acceptance of the plea agreement and no undue prejudice to the 
defendant is apparent. Declaration of a misplea also seems reasonable in 
situations where some fraud or deception by one party leads to the 
acceptance of the plea agreement by the other party or the court. There may 
be other circumstances where the balancing of the interests and [the] 
legitimate expectations of the defendant and the public will also warrant a 
misplea, but we need not reach that question today. 
717 P.2d at 1305 (emphasis added). The Court added that "considerations of fundamental 
fairness" must govern. Id. 
Under these standards, a misplea is the appropriate remedy in this case. We have 
no doubt that if the prosecutor or the defendant had been denied an opportunity to be 
heard before the plea was accepted, this Court would immediately recognize a misplea. 
Crime victim's rights deserve no less respect. As in Kay, considerations of "fundamental 
fairness" require the Court to declare a misplea to protect the integrity of those rights. Cf. 
Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1 )(a) (crime victims have the right to be treated with "fairness"). 
In addition to Kay, other Utah cases clearly recognize the appropriateness of a 
misplea in situations analogous to this one. For example, State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188 
(Utah 1998), held that the trial court acted improperly in accepting, over the prosecution's 
objections, a plea to a lesser charge that effectively blocked prosecution for a more 
serious charge. The Court of Appeals explained that "[a]n abuse of discretion results 
when the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors" in accepting a plea. Id. at 
1190 (emphasis added). Here, of course, this court did not consider "all legally relevant 
17 
factors" because it did not hear the victim's specific objections before accepting the plea. 
Similarly, in State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the trial 
judge accepted a plea in abeyance in a case involving sex abuse of a six-year-old girl. 
The Attorney General's Office later determined that this plea violated a state statute 
forbidding a plea in abeyance in a case involving sex abuse of a young child. The trial 
judge thereafter set aside the plea over the defendant's objections. The Utah Court of 
Appeals affirmed, explaining that the trial court could declare a misplea "where a trial 
court determines sua sponte that 'plain error' exists compelling reversal of the case . . . . 
Here, before learning defendant's guilty plea was illegal, the trial judge had already 
approved and accepted the plea agreement. The court subsequently learned the 
defendant's plea was contrary to law and it therefore [properly] vacated the plea." Id. at 
1023-24. In this case, the court's procedure in accepting the plea was also "contrary to 
law" — specifically, the constitutional requirement that victims be heard before any plea 
is accepted - and there was a plain error in denying the victim's right to be heard. 
Accordingly, under Moss, the district court should have "sua sponte" vacated the plea. 
B. Double Jeopardy Creates No Barrier to Declaring a Misplea. 
In the court below, the parties briefly suggested that the prohibition of double 
jeopardy might prevent declaration of a misplea. Their suggestion is misplaced. 
Both the federal and state constitutions provide that no person shall "be twice put 
in jeopardy" for the same offense. U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const., art. I, § 12. State 
v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1302 (Utah 1986), seems to have held that jeopardy attaches once 
18 
a defendant has plead guilty to an offense. Even assuming jeopardy attached when the 
defendant pled guilty,12 this fact only "begins, rather than ends [the] inquiry as to whether 
double jeopardy bars defendant's retrial." State v. Moss, 921 P.2d at 1025. At least four 
Utah appellate cases have allowed a plea to be set aside and a defendant reprosecuted 
consistent with double jeopardy principles. The leading case is State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 
1294, 1304 (Utah 1986), which held that "by permitting the declaration of a misplea 
under appropriate circumstances, the legitimate interest of the public in assuring that 
criminal prosecutions are not frustrated by a clumsy application of the double jeopardy 
clause is protected." Similarly, State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), 
concluded that "because manifest necessity justified the trial court's subsequent vacation 
of that plea and the defendant was not unduly prejudiced, his rights against double 
jeopardy were not implicated." Likewise, State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1191 n.l (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998)(internal citation omitted), held that "[notwithstanding the trial court's 
12
 There are "seemingly conflicting rules in Utah's appellate decisions on this 
point" of whether jeopardy attaches at the time of the entry of a guilty plea. State v. 
Horrocks, 2001 UT App. 4, <J[ 14, 17 P.3d 1145, 1149. In particular, in apparent contrast 
to State v. Kay, both State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 1101,1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and State 
v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150, 1150-51 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), appear to establish the rule that 
jeopardy does not attach until a district judge signs an order finally sentencing the 
defendant. In an effort to reconcile these possibly conflicting decisions, Horrocks 
essentially limited Wright and Curry to situations where a judge had orally entered a 
sentencing decision pending receipt of a pre-sentence report. In our view, the Horrocks 
distinction between Wright and Curry on the one hand (tentative sentencing decision) 
versus Kay on the other (prosecution seeking to set aside plea) is unsatisfactory. It is 
possible that Kay was simply wrong on this issue, as there is authority for finding that 
jeopardy does not attach until entry of the sentencing order. See, e.g., United States v. 
Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616 (1st Cir.1987). The Court here could resolve this point in 
our favor by adopting the clear rule that jeopardy does not attach until the imposition of 
sentence. 
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acceptance of respondent's guilty pleas, respondent should not be entitled to use the 
Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to prevent the State from completing its prosecution 
on the remaining charges." Finally, the recent case of State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App. 4, 
17 P.3d 1145, held that where a defendant had mislead the court, a plea could be set aside 
and a trial ordered on the original charges. The court explained that the "defendant was 
placed in essentially the same position as he was prior to the misplea." 2001 UT App. 4, 
132, 17P.3datll52. 
As all these cases make clear, double jeopardy principles do not create a barrier to 
declaring a misplea in appropriate circumstances. Instead, trial courts are obligated to 
consider the "balancing of interests" and possible unfair prejudice to a defendant in 
deciding whether to declare a misplea. In this case, the violation of the victim's 
constitutional right to be heard justified - indeed required - a misplea. The balance of 
competing interests tips decisively in favor of a misplea. Only a misplea could vindicate 
M.R.'s constitutional right to be heard before any plea was accepted. Any other result 
would deny him forever that important right. On the other hand, the defendant would in 
no way have been prejudiced by the declaration of a misplea. The defendant had no 
legitimate interest in the court's acceptance of plea based on less than complete 
information. See Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 Wash 
U.L.Q. 301, 310-13 (1987) ("the defendant has no right to have the court assess the plea 
bargain on less than the total amount of available information"). Nor would the 
defendant be unfairly prejudiced in any way. The defendant was alerted to the violation 
20 
of the victim's rights shortly after the plea. The fact that the trial court might have 
ultimately rejected the plea is not the kind of unfair prejudice that would entitle him to 
object. As Moss explained in upholding a misplea, "to establish undue prejudice a 
defendant must show that he or she has taken some affirmative action which would 
materially and substantially affect the outcome of a subsequent retrial. Where the 
defendant is simply placed in the same position as he or she was prior to the guilty plea, 
there is no undue prejudice to the defendant." 921 P.2d at 1026-27.13 
The fact that the defendant has since been sentenced and has now served a good 
part of his sentence does not change these considerations. M.R. raised proper and timely 
objections to the district court's refusal to declare a misplea and has expeditiously 
pursued his appellate remedies. In such circumstances, the defendant here can have no 
reasonable reliance that his plea will be invulnerable to appellate attack, as held in Kay, 
Moss, and the other cases we discuss. Moreover, the victim has statutorily and 
constitutionally protected rights to appeal the misplea issue. See Part IV, infra. Allowing 
double jeopardy considerations to bar that appeal would either deny victims their 
protected right of appeal or potentially result in future cases in the cumbersome 
requirement that no sentence could be finally imposed while a victim's appeal was 
pending. 
13
 The misplea analysis might have been different if the victim had waited to 
object until the court had already imposed a sentence on the defendant. That issue is not 
presented by this appeal. 
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C. The Utah Victims' Rights Statutes Authorize a Misplea. 
In the court below, the defendant conceded that the prosecutor violated M.R.'s 
right to make a statement. The defendant claimed, however, that this violation could not 
be remedied. Instead, claimed the defendant, the victim could seek only prospective 
injunctive relief - relief for future cases that would, by definition, do nothing for him. 
The absurdity of this position is highlighted by contrasting victims' rights with 
defendants' rights. Surely no one would claim that a defendant could seek only 
prospective relief for a violation of his rights. If a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is violated, for example, we do not expect him to accept the prospective remedy 
of getting a lawyer in the next criminal case - he gets in lawyer in that case. Similarly, if 
the defendant's rights are violated at a plea hearing, he is entitled to immediate correction 
of the problem. See, e.g., State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) (trial court's 
failure to comply strictly with rules is good cause defendant's withdrawal of a plea). 
The central idea behind the Victim's Rights Amendment was to put victims on 
parallel footing with defendants. As explained to the voters when the proposition was on 
the ballot, "Currently crime victims do not have the same constitutional rights as criminal 
defendants. In fact, they have few rights at all. Proposition 1 will balance the scales of 
justice by establishing and protecting victim's rights in Utah's constitution." Utah Voter 
Information Pamphlet, General Election, Nov. 8, 1994, at 9 (emphasis added). Just as a 
defendant's rights are vindicated in on-going proceedings, so too must a victim's be. Any 
other conclusion would convert solemn constitutional commitments made to victims into 
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mere paper promises - illusory rights that, in practice, give victims nothing. 
The victims' rights statutes make clear that victims are entitled to immediate relief 
when their rights are violated. The Victim's Rights Act specifically provides that victims 
may "bring an action . . . for a writ of mandamus defining or enforcing the rights of 
victims under this chapter . . . ." Utah Code. Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(a)(i) (emphases added). 
Of course, the action M.R. filed sought to "define" and "enforce" his rights - specifically, 
his right to be heard at plea hearings.14 The plain language of the legislation authorized 
the trial court to act on the motion to "enforce" the victim's rights. 
Bolstering this interpretation is the provision authorizing victim appeals of adverse 
"rulings" on their "motions." This statute provides: "Adverse rulings . . . on a motion or 
request by a victim of a crime . . . may be appealed under the rules governing appellate 
actions . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(b). This statute unequivocally recognizes 
that the victims will bring "motions" which, if denied, can be appealed. Indeed, the 
statute is written in this fashion precisely so that the victims could bring actions in the 
middle of court proceedings to vindicate their rights immediately. As the drafters of the 
Victims' Rights Amendment explained: 
14
 Both the state and the defendant suggested at various points in their pleadings 
below that the style of the victim's pleading (writ of mandamus, amicus brief, special 
action, etc.) might make some difference to the outcome here. Form should not triumph 
over substance, particularly where the state courts have yet to provide specific guidance 
to crime victims on filing their pleadings. Our motion for a misplea properly presented 
the substance of the victim's claims. In the court below, we also sought leave to have our 
pleadings construed as complying with any form that the court might find to be 
appropriate or, in the alternative, for leave to immediately file in that new form (R. 296). 
Thus, our pleadings fully conformed with whatever procedural device might be required 
to trigger relief. 
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For example, if a court denies a victim her right to be heard at a sentencing 
hearing, she can file a motion for a declaratory judgment that she is entitled 
to speak. If the judge persists in denying the right to speak, an appeal may 
be taken from the adverse ruling under the rules governing appellate 
actions. 
Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice, supra, 1994 Utah L. Rev. at 1420. It is 
also important to understand that the statute specifically authorizes victims to appeal from 
adverse "rulings" on their "motions," instead of requiring them to wait for the "final order 
and judgment," which is the conventional prerequisite for an appeal. Compare Utah 
Code. Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(b) ("Adverse rulings . . . on a motion or request by a victim of 
a crime . . . may be appealed under the rules governing appellate actions . . . .") (emphasis 
added) with Utah R. App. P. 3 (authorizing appeals from "all final orders and 
judgments"). This demonstrates that victims can seek immediate relief in their case. 
In support of his claim that victims are remitted to purely prospective relief, the 
defendant cited below Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12(2), which provides: 
This chapter may not be construed as creating a basis for dismissing any 
criminal charge or delinquency petition, vacating any adjudication or 
conviction, admission or plea of guilty or no contest, or for appellate, 
habeas corpus, except in juvenile cases [sic], or other relief from a 
judgment in any criminal or delinquency case. 
This provision was not designed to block victims from obtaining relief. Instead, its 
narrow purpose was to prevent defendants from taking advantage of the Rights of Crime 
Victims Act. This intent is readily apparent from the plain language of the provision, 
which forbids "dismissing" criminal charges, "vacating" a plea of guilty, or for "other 
relief from a judgment in a criminal case - all words that apply to motions brought by 
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criminal defendants. For example, the provision prevents a defendant who is unhappy 
with a sentence imposed under a plea bargain from trying to escape that sentence under 
the guise of protecting a victim's right. As the drafters of the provision have explained: 
Under . . . the Rights of Crime Victims Act, defendants have no right 
to dismiss pending criminal charges or reverse an otherwise valid criminal 
conviction. This limitation is designed to ensure that the enactments are 
used only by their beneficiaries — crime victims — not the perpetrators of 
criminal offenses, 
Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice, supra, 1994 Utah L. Rev. at 1421 (emphases 
added). 
The plain language of the provision has no application to a victim who has been 
denied the right to be heard on what the victim views as an unduly lenient plea bargain. 
Such a victim does not seek to "vacate" a "plea of guilty." Instead, the victim seeks to 
reinstate charges - e.g., here the first degree felony charges dismissed by the plea 
agreement. It is significant, moreover, that the provision specifically forbids only 
vacating a "plea of guilty." Utah's appellate cases clearly recognize a difference between 
vacating the defendant's "plea of guilty" and aborting a prosecutor's agreement not to 
press charges. For example, the closing sentence in State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1307 
(Utah 1986), upholds the trial court's invalidation of the plea agreement (the "misplea" 
discussed earlier) and gives defendant Kay an option: "Kay may either withdraw the 
guilty pleas that were given as part of the aborted plea agreement and enter new pleas or 
he may choose to stand on his guilty pleas and proceed to sentencing 
That is precisely the approach the victim suggested here. M.R. raised no challenge 
25 
to defendant Casey's plea of guilty to lewdness involving a child, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5. Instead, the victim challenged the prosecutor's agreement -
embodied in the plea agreement - not to prosecute Casey for committing aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(3), a first degree 
felony with different elements found in an entirely separate chapter of the Utah Code. To 
be sure, the prosecutor's decision to not pursue the first degree felony led to the 
defendant's decision to plead guilty. M.R. does not suggest that defendant Casey would 
somehow have been bound to his side of the plea agreement after the prosecution's side is 
vacated. But § 77-38-12(2) simply has no application to a victim's effort to insure that a 
court makes a plea decision in compliance with victim's rights. Indeed, it would have 
been a simple matter for the legislature, if had it so intended, to say that nothing in the 
chapter provides grounds for vacating any "plea agreement." In keeping with its 
narrower focus, the legislature provided only that nothing in the chapter would provide 
grounds for vacating any "plea of guilty." 
Section 77-38-12(2) is inapplicable to the present case for other reasons as well. 
The provision indicates that nothing in "this chapter may be construed as creating a 
basis" for various forms of relief from a criminal judgment. This "chapter," of course, 
means chapter 38 of title 77 — the Rights of Crime Victims Act. As explained in Part 
LA, supra, M.R.'s right to be heard derived not only from chapter 38, but also from 
(among other sources) article I, § 28 of the state constitution and chapter 37 of title 77. 
Moreover, M.R. does not contend that the right to declare a misplea was "created" by 
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chapter 38. The misplea procedure was recognized well before the passage of the Rights 
of Crime Victims Act in 1994, by pre-existing cases such as State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294 
(Utah 1986). This is important because, immediately following the no-benefits-for-
defendants provision, the legislature specifically added a protective rule of construction to 
carry forward all other pre-existing rights of crime victims: "The enumeration of certain 
rights for crime victims in this chapter shall not be construed to deny or disparage other 
rights granted by the Utah Constitution or the Legislature or retained by victims of 
crimes." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12(6). 
The foregoing is enough to establish that the no-benefits-for-defendants provision 
does not strip a victim of the right to secure relief when his rights have been violated. But 
if there were any ambiguity in the provision, it must be resolved in favor of the victim. In 
the immediately proceeding provision, the legislature emphatically and unequivocally 
declared: "All of the provisions contained in this chapter shall be construed to assist the 
victims of crime." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12(1) (emphases added). Plainly the 
defendant's proposed construction would not "assist" the victims of crime and therefore, 
for that reason alone, must be rejected. 
D. Provisions in the Utah Constitution Guarantee Victims the 
Opportunity to Seek a Misplea. 
The previous section of this brief establishes that the relevant statutes do not block 
a crime victim from obtaining a misplea to vindicate his rights. But if, contrary to our 
submission, the statutes are somehow construed to block a misplea, they would plainly 
violate the Victims' Rights Amendment, Utah Const., art. I, § 28, and the Open Courts 
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Clause, Utah Const, art. I, § 11. These potential constitutional violations provide an 
additional reason for construing the statutes as we suggest. See Provo City Corp. v. State, 
795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990) ("We have a duty to construe statutes to avoid 
constitutional conflicts."). 
1. The Victims' Rights Amendment. 
Interpreting provisions such Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12(2) as barring a misplea 
would be unconstitutional under the Victims' Rights Amendment. As we have 
explained, see Part LA, supra, the Amendment guaranteed M.R. a right "to be heard" 
before any plea was accepted. This constitutional right is presumed to be self-executing. 
See Spackman ex rel Spackman v. Board ofEduc, 2000 UT 87, f 11, 16 P.3d 533, 536 
(citing Utah Const., art. I, § 26 (provisions in the Utah Constitution are "mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise")). Moreover, the 
victim's right to be heard "articulates a rule sufficient to give effect to the underlying 
rights and duties intended by the framers. In other words,.. . the framers intended the 
provision to have immediate effect and . . . no ancillary legislation is necessary to the 
enjoyment of a right given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed." Id. at f 7, 16 P.3d at 
535. Indeed, the drafters of the Victims' Rights Amendment directly indicated their 
intention that the Victims' Rights Amendment be self-executing. See Cassell, supra, 
1994 Utah L. Rev. at 1387 ("substantive parts of the Victims' Rights Amendment" are 
"intended to be self-executing in the sense that state actors are obligated to follow [their] 
commends even without further legislative action"). The fact that the legislature also 
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enacted the supplementary Rights of Crime Victims Act "does not prevent the provision 
from being self-executing." Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996). 
A statute cannot subvert the victim's self-executing constitutional right. This 
Court has emphasized that "'any rule or regulation in regard to the remedy which does 
not, under pretense of modifying or regulating it, take away or impair the right itself, 
cannot be regarded as beyond the proper province of legislation.'" Bott v. DeLand, 922 
P.2d 732, 736 (Utah 1996) (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 756 
(1927)).15 In this case, reading the statutes as depriving M.R. of any remedy for violation 
of his right, would effectively "take away and impair" his right to be heard and thus was 
beyond the "proper province of legislation." In Bott v. DeLand, this Court refused to 
apply statutes that it viewed as "an unreasonable regulation of a claimant's constitutional 
right. Id. at 736. To construe the statutes here as barring a misplea would go much 
further, creating not merely an "unreasonable regulation" of M.R.'s right, but rather a 
total abrogation of that right. 
Additional constitutional support for this conclusion come from the provision in 
the Victims' Rights Amendment guaranteeing crime victims the right "to be treated with 
fairness " Utah Const., art. I, § 28(l)(a); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(3) 
(defining "fairness" as meaning "treating the victim reasonably, even-handedly, and 
impartially"). It is simply not treating the crime victim with "fairness" — that is, 
15
 Botfs holding concerning money damages for a violation of a constitutional 
damages must now be read in light of Spackman, 2000 UT 87, \ 20 n.5, 16 P.3d at 537 
n.5. This issue is not present here, since the Victims' Rights Amendment by its own 
terms precludes the award of money damages. Utah Const., art. I, § 28(2). 
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"reasonably" and "even-handedly" — to deny any opportunity for vindicating their rights, 
including their right to be heard before a plea is accepted. Criminal defendants, of 
course, are guaranteed an opportunity to vindicate their rights; and prosecutors, too, have 
been given the chance to obtain a misplea when their interests have not been protected. 
See, e.g., State v. Kay, supra; State v. Moss, supra. The fundamental goal of the Victims 
Rights' Amendment was to ensure that crime victims received equivalent treatment. See 
Utah Voter Information Pamphlet, General Election, Nov. 8, 1994 at 9 ("crime victims do 
not have the same constitutional rights as criminal defendants. . . . Proposition 1 will 
balance the scales of justice by establishing .. . victims' rights in Utah's Constitution."). 
Fairness requires that the rights of crime victims, no less than the rights of other actors in 
the criminal justice system, be protected through the right to seek a misplea. 
2. The Open Court's Clause. 
If the Utah statutes were understood as blocking a misplea, they would also plainly 
violate the Open Courts Clause, Utah Const, art. I, § 11, which provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay . . . . 
This Court has explained that the Open Courts Clause was designed to guarantee "access 
to the courts and [to] a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality." Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). The Clause is not "time-bound," Day v. 
State ex reL Dept. of Public Safety, 980 P.2d 1171, 1183 (Utah 1999), but instead protects 
new rights like those protected in the victims' rights enactments. See id. Moreover, the 
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Open Courts Clause requires "heightened scrutiny" of legislation that impairs remedies 
for "an important constitutionally based personal right." Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 
1357, 1365 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Victims' rights are important personal rights now 
based in the state constitution. See Utah Const., art. I, § 28. 
If Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12(2) is interpreted to block any remedy for a victim 
whose constitutional right to be heard has plainly been violated, then § 77-38-12(2) would 
blatantly run afoul of the Open Courts Clause. Such an interpretation would strip a victim 
of any "effective and reasonable" remedy for a violation of the right to be heard. Day v. 
State ex rel. Dept. of State, 980 P.2d 1171, 1185 (Utah 1999). Denying any remedy for 
violation of a constitutional right is conceivable only where "there is a clear social or 
economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an 
arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective." Id. at 1185 (internal 
citation omitted). The legislature has not identified any "clear" evil that blocking a 
misplea would eliminate, at least in the narrow circumstances presented by this case. The 
only conceivable "evil" might be some modest expenditure of court time in considering 
mispleas in those rare cases when a prosecutor violates the victim's rights to be heard. 
Such a justification is inadequate for a complete invalidation of a victim's rights. See 
Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, f 56, 5 P.3d 616, 632 (Utah 2000) (concluding under Open 
Courts Clause that "reducing the cost to government of assuming liability . . . [is] not a 
sufficient justification . . . . " for capping damage awards). Moreover, entirely 
eliminating any possibility of a misplea — regardless of the egregiousness of the violation 
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and the other circumstances that might justify a new hearing — is an arbitrary and 
unreasonable means of furthering any end that the legislature might have identified. 
Rather than construe state statutes to unconstitutionally impair the right of victims to 
obtain any access to the courts, they should be interpreted to allow a misplea. 
E. The District Court's Actions Did Not Protect M.R.'s Rights. 
The district court's decision not to declare a misplea should be reversed. After the 
hearing on the motion for the misplea, the district court never declared a misplea. Rather 
the district court said only that it would "informally reopen the plea for the purpose of 
hearing that testimony [from M.R. and Ms. Casey] . . . and the Court will also accept the 
testimony now . . . as it has been rendered in respect to sentencing" (R. 328:45 (emphases 
added). This is obviously not declaring a misplea. Nor does it give the victim's statement 
the weight which it was entitled. The victim has a constitutional guarantee to more than 
"informal" consideration of his concerns about a plea and that consideration must take 
place not after the fact in respect to "sentencing," but at the time of the acceptance or 
rejection of the plea. As the district court's statements make clear, the victim did not 
receive that protection. 
It is not clear why the district court declined to reopen the plea hearing. Perhaps 
the district court was concerned about statutory or double jeopardy issues; or perhaps the 
district court believed that victim's statements were not entitled to any weight - there is 
simply no way to tell. The failure of the district court to make any findings "prevents a 
meaningful review of the trial court's ruling." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah 
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Ct. App. 1998). Failure to make such findings provides an additional reason for reversal. 
For all these reasons, the district court's decision not to reopen the plea hearing 
was clear error. It should be reversed and the case remanded for proper consideration of 
the victim's objection. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING A PLEA IN THE 
ABSENCE OF FINDINGS THAT ITS ACCEPTANCE IS IN THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST. 
On remand, a central issue in this case will be the appropriate standard a district 
court should apply in considering plea bargains. In the trial court, both the defendant and 
the prosecutor claimed that together they made the "final decision" about any plea bargain 
(R. 160,266). Judge Young apparently adopted this position, briefly concluding: 'The 
Court finds that the prosecutor should have, does have, and did in this case, exercise 
discretion in his negotiations with the defense attorney. They entered into that agreement 
with sound legal considerations that they alone basically negotiated and knew together 
and on that basis, the Court accepts and reaffirms the plea at the Class A level and denies 
any request to the contrary." (R. 328:45 (emphases added))., 
The defendant and the state seriously misapprehended both the plea bargaining 
process and the victim's role within it, leading Judge Young to abdicate completely his 
judicial responsibility for monitoring pleas. The judicial role is explicitly recognized in 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states directly that "[t]he court 
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty" (emphasis added). These words mean what they 
say. As has been recognized in several appellate decisions, "'nothing in Rule 11(e) 
33 
requires a court to accept a guilty plea.'" State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (quoting State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). In completely 
failing to perform that role, Judge Young committed clear error. 
The Utah appellate courts have yet to articulate the appropriate standard to be used 
by a judge in determining whether to accept or reject a plea. This is a critical issue for 
prosecutors, defendants, the public - and crime victims. As the West Virginia Supreme 
Court has noted in establishing a standard for evaluating plea bargains, "discretion 
without a criterion for its exercise is authorization of arbitrariness." State v. Sears, 542 
S.E.2d 863, 867 (W. Va. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). 
To avoid arbitrariness, we urge the Court to take this occasion to provide the 
standard for evaluating pleas. In articulating a standard, the Court should be aware of 
considerable public dissatisfaction with the institution of plea bargaining. Commentators 
have recognized the concern that the practice can create "an image of corruption in the 
system, or at least an image of a system lacking meaningful purpose and subject to 
manipulation by those who are wise to the right tricks." 5 Wayne L. LaFave et al., 
Criminal Procedure § 21.1(f) at 19 (2d. ed. 1999) (internal quotation omitted). To 
defendants, victims, and the public alike, "outcomes do not appear to be determined by 
principles or careful consideration of persons, but by hustling, conning, manipulating, 
bargaining, luck, fortitude, waiting them out, and the like." Albert Alschuler, Book 
Review, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev.1007, 1041 (1979) (internal quotation omitted). For these 
reasons, at least one national commission and various commentators have proposed 
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eliminating plea bargaining. See, e.g., National Advisory Comm'n on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals, The Courts § 3.1 (1973); Stephen Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as a 
Disaster, 101 Yale L.J. 1979 (1992).; Alschuler, supra. 
Against the backdrop of potential problems with plea bargaining, the narrow issue 
presented here is what standard trial judges should use to review any deal negotiated by 
prosecutors and defense attorneys when a crime victim voices opposition. We submit that 
Utah should use a flexible, public interest standard. The public interest standard is used 
in many state courts.16 Federal courts have also applied this standard under Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is quite similar to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah Court of Appeals 
1998) (noting similarity between state and federal rule). The federal cases have held that 
"'Rule 11 also contemplates the rejection of a negotiated plea when the district court 
believes that bargain is too lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.'" United States 
v. Carrigan, US F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (quoting United 
States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983)). Under this standard, the federal 
courts have recognized that "a decision that a plea bargain will result in the defendant's 
receiving too light a sentence under the circumstances of the case is a sound reason for a 
judge's refusing to accept the agreement." United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 704 (5th 
Cir. 1977). To be sure, operating under this standard, Utah's district court judges would 
have considerable discretion in reviewing pleas. See Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462. But 
16
 We collect the relevant citations in Addendum D. 
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recognizing judicial discretion under a broad standard is a far cry from the approach taken 
by Judge Young - who simply abdicated any judicial review whatsoever. A trial court's 
proper role is not "merely providing the court's 'rubber stamp' for the defendant's plea, 
regardless of the level of imposition on the judge's sentencing discretion." People v. 
Grove, 566 N.W.2d 547, 555 (Mich. 1997). 
The "public interest" standard for reviewing pleas is also consistent with the 
Victims' Rights Amendment. As we explained earlier, see Part LA, supra, the Victims' 
Rights Amendment gives a crime victim the right to be "heard" before any plea is 
accepted. That right would be meaningless if the statement of the victim could not make 
a difference to the criminal justice process. Among members of the public, victims' 
interests are the most directly affected by the prosecution. As a result, their statements 
may frequently provide the court with important information about whether a proposed 
plea is unduly lenient or otherwise not in the public interest. Giving weight to their 
statements under a public interest standard implements the mandate of the Victims' 
Rights Amendment. 
Other state courts have recognized that victims' interests are part of public interest 
calculation. For example, in State v. Sears, 542 S.E.2d 863 (W. Va. 2000), a trial court 
rejected a plea bargain without reviewing the substance of the agreement because it was 
offered the day before the trial. The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed, explaining 
that a "court's ultimate discretion in accepting or rejecting a plea agreement is whether it 
is consistent with the public interest in the fair administration of justice." Id. at 867 
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(quoting Myers v. Frailer, 319 S.E.2d 782, 788 (W. Va. 1984)). In administering this 
standard, the court instructed that "consideration must be giver* not only to the general 
public's perception that crimes should be prosecuted, but to the interests of the victim as 
well." 542 S.E.2d at 867 (emphases added). Similarly, in People v. Grove, 566 N.W.2d 
547 (Mich. 1997), the Michigan Supreme Court found that the trial court acted within its 
discretion in rejecting a plea bargain where the victim had requested a prison sentence, 
something not contemplated under the proposed plea agreement. The Court explained 
that "the judge's reasoning reflected his understanding of the plea agreement, considering 
the facts and the interests of the victim, as a substantial hindrance of his ability to impose 
an appropriate sentence under the plea bargain . . . ." Id. at 558 (emphasis added). 
Once this Court remands this case because of the district court's failure to grant a 
misplea, we will establish to the district court that the misdemeanor disposition of the 
plea was clearly not in the public interest. In particular, a misdemeanor disposition is not 
commensurate with the seriousness of the crimes committed by defendant Casey. 
Moreover, the evidence supporting the original first degree felony charges was quite 
strong and the prosecutor simply misassessed the strength of his case in dropping it all the 
way down to a misdemeanor. These questions, however, are specific factual issues that 
should be resolved by the district court in the first instance.17 
Before concluding this section of our brief, it is important to emphasize the limits 
to our position. In most cases, all of the interested persons - the prosecutor, the 
17
 In the event that the Court wishes to reach this question, our arguments can be 
found in our pleading below urging the plea be rejected (R. 152). 
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defendant, and the victim - will agree on the proposed plea bargain. Victims, no less than 
prosecutors and defense attorneys can understand the risks of going to trial. This case is a 
rare one, in which there was disagreement between the victim and the parties as to the 
proper disposition. It is in precisely such cases that the court should carefully examine a 
proposed plea and determine whether the public interest supports its acceptance.18 
IV. A CRIME VICTIM IS ENTITLED TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF 
DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS DENYING VICTIMS' RIGHTS. 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-11(2) Entitles M.R. to Appellate Review of His 
Motion for a Misplea. 
In the trial court, M.R. filed both a motion for declaration of a misplea (R. 110) 
and a motion for the court to reject the plea bargain (R. 142). Under the Utah statutes, 
M.R. is plainly entitled to appellate review of the first motion. Because a reversal of the 
district court on that motion would send the case back for further review, this Court need 
not reach the more complicated issue of whether M.R. would be entitled to appellate 
review of his motion challenging the plea bargain. 
M.R. is entitled to review of the trial court's decision to decline to reopen the plea 
hearing to give him an opportunity to speak. Two provisions of the Utah Code clearly 
establish a right of appellate review of the denial of a motion by a crime victim. First, § 
77-38-1 l(2)(b) specifically provides: "Adverse rulings on these actions or on a motion or 
request brought by a victim of a crime . . . may be appealed under the rules governing 
appellate actions . . . . " (emphasis added). Second, § 77-38-1 l(2)(c), specifically 
18
 When no opposition has been expressed, the trial court would be free, under our 
proposal, to assume that a proposed plea is in the public interest. 
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provides: "An appellate court shall review all such properly presented issues, including 
issues that are capable of repetition but would otherwise evade review" (emphasis added). 
Lest there be any doubt about the obvious import of these provisions, their heading in the 
Utah Code is "Enforcement — Appellate Review 
M.R.'s motion for declaration of a misplea is plainly covered by these provisions. 
As we explained above, see Part II.E, supra, Judge Young denied M.R.'s motion for a 
misplea by refusing to reopen the plea hearing to give M.R. an opportunity to be heard 
with respect to the plea bargain. That was undoubtedly an "adverse ruling" on a "motion" 
brought by a victim of crime and thus, under § 77-38-1 l(2)(b), it "may be appealed under 
the rules governing appellate actions " That is precisely the path M.R. has followed. 
Although the plain meaning of these provisions leaves no need to resort to 
legislative intent, the legislative history fully confirms that the legislature intended to 
allow victims to appeal. The primary sponsor of the Rights of Crime Victims Act, 
Senator Craig A. Peterson, explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee that: "The 
appellate court becomes the court of victims' rights enforcement. Where an issue has 
been identified as substantive, the appellate courts would have the oversight authority." 
Statutory Provisions on Victims' Rights: Hearings on S.B. 156 Before the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., 50th Utah Leg. Gen. Sess. (Feb. 11, 1994) (Sen. recording B) 
(emphasis added). Senator Peterson and Representative R. Lee Ellertson have also 
explained that when a district court denies a victim the right to speak, "an appeal may be 
taken from the adverse ruling under the rules governing appellate actions.... The statute 
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authorizes victim appeals from adverse 'rulings' rather than adverse 'final orders and 
judgments.' Therefore, victims need not wait for the conclusion of a criminal proceeding 
to take an appeal." Cassell, supra, 1994 Utah L. Rev. at 1420 & n.235 (law review article 
endorsed by Peterson and Ellertson as a statement of their intentions). 
Although the relevant statutes directly authorizing this appeal were cited in our 
docketing statement, defendant Casey has nonetheless filed a motion to dismiss. (This 
Court has deferred ruling on this motion pending full briefing.) The defendant's motion to 
dismiss claims that the victim somehow lacks "standing" to enforce his rights under the 
Victims' Rights Amendment and the Rights of Crime Victims Act. It is a curious position 
that a victim would somehow lack standing to enforce his rights under victims' 
enactments. This view subverts the entire thrust of the Victims' Rights Amendment, 
which gives victims a constitutionally protected right "to be heard at important criminal 
justice hearings related to the victim." Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1 )(b). Implementing this 
constitutional right, the Rights of Crime Victims Act specifically provides that a victim 
may "bring an action for declaratory relief or for a writ of mandamus defining or 
enforcing the rights of victims under this chapter . . . ." Utah Code. Ann. § 77-38-
ll(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
The controlling legal authorities clearly hold that the victim has standing to pursue 
this appeal. "[T]he Utah courts have substantial discretionary authority to confer standing 
upon appropriate parties because they are not constrained by the case or controversy 
requirements contained in the federal constitution . . . . " Olson v. Salt Lake City School 
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District, 724 P.2d 960, 962 n.l (Utah 1986). Under this liberal test, the victim has 
standing if "any one" of three criteria are met: 
(1) the interests of the parties are adverse, and the party seeking relief has a 
legally protectible interest in the controversy; (2) no one has a greater 
interest than that party and the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if standing 
is denied; or (3) the issues raised by the party are of great public importance 
and ought to be judicially resolved. 
State ex rei M.W., 2000 UT 79, f 12, 12 P.3d 80, 83 (citations omitted). 
While the victim here need only satisfy one of these three criteria, the victim in 
fact meets all three. First, the victim "has a legally protectible interest in the controversy" 
- specifically, a constitutionally protected right to be heard before any plea bargain is 
accepted. See Utah Const., art. I, § 28(l)(b). Protecting that interest is the very reason 
for this appeal. Second, it is obvious that no one has a greater interest than the victim in 
protecting the victim's right to be heard concerning a plea bargain. The state and the 
defendant have also made clear that their interest, if any, in raising this issue is not as 
great as the victim's. Third, there appears to be no doubt that the issue of a crime 
victim's right to be heard concerning plea bargains is "of great public importance." 
Courts have reviewed such important issues even where the party presenting the 
claim was not actually a party to the underlying litigation. State ex rei M.W., 2000 Utah 
79, 12 P.3d 80 (Utah 2000), for example, involved a challenge by a father to an order 
granting custody of children to their maternal grandmother. Even though the state was 
not a party to the trial, the Supreme Court allowed the state to seek further appellate 
review of an important issue concerning a presumption in favor of the parent in custody 
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proceedings. The "issue upon which the State seeks review," said the Court, "is of great 
public importance and should be judicially resolved." Id. at \ 12, 12 P.3d at 83.19 The 
issues here are likewise of great public importance and should be judicially resolved. 
The foregoing makes clear that M.R. was entitled to take a direct appeal from the 
denial of his motion for a misplea, and we ask this Court to so rule. An additional basis 
for appeal, however, would be for this Court to construe our pleadings as a petition for 
permission to appeal from an interlocutory order under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The interlocutory order is the district court's denial of the victim's 
motion for a misplea. To permit this construction, our notice of appeal lists both this 
order and the final judgment as the orders from which we are appealing. We have also 
filed our docketing statement within the time period specified in the Rule 5 time limit for 
interlocutory appeals - i.e., within 20 days of the district court's denial of our motion for 
a misplea.20 
There are other cases of similar import. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Utah Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Control Board, 964 P.2d 335 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (allowing Sierra 
Club and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation to challenge permit for disposal of 
hazardous waste because the "issues in this case clearly qualify as issues of significant 
public importance"); National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State 
Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (Utah 1993) (allowing environmental group to challenge land 
transfer based on "possible inimical environmental effects"). 
20
 If for some reason the court were to conclude that an appeal is not the proper 
vehicle for a victim to obtain appellate review of a denial of victim's rights in the trial 
court, our docketing statement asked this Court to construe our pleadings as a petition for 
extraordinary relief under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65B 
authorizes such relief where "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available" 
and where an inferior court "has refused the petitioner the . . . enjoyment of a r ight. . . to 
which the petitioner is entitled." To permit the court to proceed in this fashion if 
necessary, we have served all of our pleadings on the putative respondent in such an 
action - the Hon. David S. Young, Third District Judge, through the Administrative 
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B. The Utah Constitution Guarantees Crime Victims the Right to Appeal. 
The statutes cited in the previous section make clear that a victim is entitled to take 
an appeal from an adverse ruling on a motion concerning victim's rights. Not only does 
the plain language of the statutes lead to this conclusion, but any other reading would 
conflict with at least three provisions of the Utah Constitution, all of which guarantee 
crime victims access to the appellate courts. 
1. The Right to Appeal Clause. 
Utah Constitution, art. VIII, § 5, provides in relevant part that "there shall be in all 
cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate 
jurisdiction over the cause" (emphasis added). The right to appeal is a valuable 
constitutional right and should not be denied except where it is clear that the right has 
been lost or abandoned. See Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). 
As we explained above, the Rights of Crime Victims Act makes clear that the victim was 
entitled to file in the district court "an action . . . enforcing the right of victims 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(a)(i). Because a victim's action was proper in the district 
court, the Right to Appeal Clause clearly guarantees crime victims an "appeal of right" to 
Office of the Courts. 
Forcing victims to proceed by way of the cumbersome Rule 65B procedure, 
however, would be less desirable than simply recognizing a victim's right to appeal and is 
contrary to the legislature's instruction that victims are entitled proceed under the "rules 
governing appellate actions," Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(b) — that is, under the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure rather than under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governing 
"extraordinary" relief. Moreover, forcing victims to proceed under the Rule 65B 
procedure might force them to meet a higher standard of proof than, for example, criminal 
defendants, contrary to the intentions of the framers of the Victims' Rights Amendments 
to insure that the rights oi victims were given equal treatment with those of defendants. 
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"a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause." 
2. The Open Courts Clause. 
As discussed previously, see Part II.D.2, supra, victim's rights are protected by the 
Open Courts Clause in the Utah Constitution, Utah Const, art. I, § 11, which provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay . . . . 
We will not repeat our previous analysis, but note here that the Clause specifically 
indicates that "all courts" shall be open for redress of injury. Any position that a victim 
could not vindicate constitutionally-protected rights in the courts — including appellate 
courts — would transgress the Open Courts Clause. Such an interpretation would not 
only strip a victim of any "effective and reasonable" remedy for a violation of the 
constitutional right to be heard. Day v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 980 P.2d 
1171, 1185 (Utah 1999). In short, the appellate courts would not be "open" to victims, 
contrary to the mandate of the Open Courts Clause. 
3. The Crime Victim's Right to Fairness. 
As we have discussed above, see Part II.D.l, supra, the Victims' Rights 
Amendment guarantees crime victims the right "to be treated with fairness . . . ." Utah 
Const., art. I, § 28(1 )(a). The legislature has defined "fairness" as meaning "treating the 
victim reasonably, even-handedly, and impartially." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(3). 
Crime victims would not be treated with "fairness" — that is, "reasonably" and "even-
handedly" — if they were denied any opportunity for appellate review of claims that their 
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constitutionally protected rights were violated. Criminal defendants, of course, have the 
right of appellate review to secure their rights. The Victims' Rights Amendment sought 
to provide equal treatment to crime victims. See Utah Voter Information Pamphlet, 
General Election, Nov. 8, 1994 at 9 ("crime victims do not have the same constitutional 
rights as criminal defendants. . . . Proposition 1 will balance the scales of justice by 
establishing and protecting victims' rights in Utah's constitution."). Fairness requires that 
the rights of crime victims not be remitted to the unreviewable discretion of a single 
district court judge, but instead, like the rights of criminal defendants and other litigants, 
receive protection from the higher courts. 
C. Recognizing a Victim's Right to Appeal Will Not Burden the Courts. 
The defendant may argue that recognizing a victim's right to appeal will somehow 
overburden the courts. Even were this argument true, it would provide no justification for 
denying crime victims access to the appellate courts. The statutes and constitutional 
provisions we have discussed clearly mandate a victim's right to appeal. These mandates 
leave no room for policy arguments over the desirability of victim appeals. 
Were the Court to undertake such a policy analysis, however, it would quickly 
discover that the competing interests tip decisively in favor of recognizing a victim's right 
to appeal. On the one hand, crime victims' rights are personal rights, sufficiently 
important to now be enshrined in the state constitution. At the same time, however, it is 
entirely predictable that individual trial court judges will, for whatever reason, from time 
to time violate victims' rights. This is not to disparage the capabilities of Utah's 
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outstanding corps of district court judges, but simply to recognize the reality that crime 
victims' constitutional rights — no less than the rights of criminal defendants or the state 
— will occasionally be violated. The Court should be aware that there is in the country 
considerable evidence of under-enforcement of crime victims' rights. See, e.g., Nat'l 
Inst, of Justice, Research in Brief, The Rights of Crime Victims — Does Legal Protection 
make a Difference? 4 exh. 1 (Dec. 1998) (collecting statistical evidence of substantial 
underenforcement of victims rights in six randomly selected states); Office for Victims of 
Crime, U.S. Dept. of Justice, New Directions from the Field: Victims' Rights and Services 
for the 21st Century 29 (1998) ("the consistent implementation and enforcement of 
[victims' rights laws] is an area of great concern"). Commentators have speculated on 
why victims' rights are so dramatically underenforced. Some attribute the problem to the 
"socialization" of lawyers "in a legal culture and structure that do not recognize the 
victims as a legitimate party in criminal proceedings." Edna Erez, Victim Participation in 
Sentencing: And the Debate Goes On . . . . , 3 Int'l Rev. of Victimology 17, 29 (1994); 
accord Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim 
Participation Model, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 289. Others blame the lack of a federal 
constitutional amendment protecting victims' rights. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, 
Barbarians at the Gates?: A Reply to the Critics of the Victims' Rights Amendment, 1999 
Utah L. Rev. 479, 533-36. The important point for present purposes is that the Court can 
hardly be sanguine about how victims' rights are enforced in Utah's trial courts. 
Recognizing a victim's right to appeal, moreover, will not burden Utah's appellate 
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court system. While a victim's right to appeal has been found in the Utah Code since 
1994, this is the first appeal by a crime victim. Victims, of course, frequently lack access 
to legal counsel, and thus may find it difficult to file criminal appeals. Cassell, supra, 
1999 Utah L. Rev. at 513-14. The victim's right to appeal that we urge in this case is also 
limited. Our position is that a victim is entitled to appeal a denial of an attempted 
assertion of right — in this case, the denial of the right to speak before a plea was 
accepted. The logic of that position would not necessarily require the Court to recognize 
a victim's right to appeal a decision by a district court, after properly hearing a victim's 
objection, to nonetheless accept a plea bargain. In such case, there would be no "denial" 
of a victim's assertion of a right, arguably the necessary trigger for a right to appeal. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 l(2)(b). However, this question of whether a victim has the 
right to appeal where the court has accepted a plea bargain after hearing a victim's 
objection can be left to another day for a case with adversarial briefing on this point. 
V. A CRIME VICTIM HAS THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD THROUGH 
COUNSEL ON LEGAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO A MOTION FOR A 
MISPLEA. 
One last issue should be decided by this Court. At various points in the 
proceedings below, the trial judge expressed skepticism about whether a victim of crime 
was entitled to be represented by counsel in attempting to assert his rights. In particular, 
when undersigned counsel attempted to present the victim's legal argument in support of 
a misplea, Judge Young explained: " . . . I have . . . at least a question in my mind as to the 
status that you have to appear here. Historically, I have not had experience with . . . 
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attorneys for victims appearing and . . . being heard" (R. 328:6). The judge continued: ". . 
.I 'm not sure that I see you in any position different than simply a friend of the court. . . 
." (R. 328:6). While the judge allowed counsel to make an argument on behalf of the 
victim, the judge never ruled on the propriety of counsel being heard. Instead, the trial 
judge ultimately concluded only that "the Court has granted . . . considerable leeway in 
hearing from Mr. Cassell without making a finding in respect to his having or lack of 
having standing in this case" (R. 328:45). 
This Court should make clear that victims of crime, no less than criminal 
defendants and the state, are entitled to be heard through counsel when their legal rights 
are at stake in complex proceedings. Defendants, of course, are entitled to have the 
assistance of counsel. As the Supreme Court explained in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 344 (1963), "reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary 
system of criminal justice, any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer 
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." The same rationale 
applies to victims, as they attempt to assert their rights in a criminal justice system that 
has, for too long, failed to recognize their interests. Seey e.g., State v. Lozano, 616 So.2d 
73, 78 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993) (reprinting trial court order construing Florida right to be 
heard as encompassing the right to participation of an attorney under the facts of the 
case).21 
21
 To be clear, we are not arguing that victims are entitled to counsel at state 
expense. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-11(3) (no right to "attorneys fees" for violations of 
victim's rights). Instead, we contend only that retained or pro bono counsel for victims 
should be heard in court proceedings when victims' rights are directly at stake. 
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Such a holding would not imply that counsel for victims can participate in, for 
example, questioning witnesses during trial proceedings. The drafters of the Victims' 
Rights Amendment very carefully crafted their enactment so that it would not interfere 
with the conduct of a trial. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4(2) ('This chapter shall not 
confer any right to the victim of a crime to be heard . . . at any criminal trial. . . unless 
called as a witness"). We thus raise no challenge to this Court's recent ruling that a court-
appointed guardian ad litem was not entitled to ask questions of witnesses in a criminal 
trial. See State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33, \\ 28-33, 419 Utah Adv. Rep. 11. That very 
ruling, however, recognized that a guardian ad litem could properly have a role in 
"matters relating specifically to the treatment of the child victim, such as assuring that the 
victim received notice and opportunity to be present and heard as mandated by the 
victims' rights statutes." Id. at^[ 28 (emphasis added) (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-37r-l 
to -5, 77-38-1 to -14). It is precisely that role in ensuring an "opportunity to be heard" 
that counsel for the victim of crime was entitled to perform in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should declare a misplea and remand this case 
to the district court for further proceedings in an opinion concluding: 
1. M.R.'s constitutional right to be heard before judicial acceptance of any plea 
bargain was violated; 
2. M.R. was entitled to a misplea because of the violation of that right; 
3. A plea bargain should be accepted only where doing so is in the public interest; 
4. Crime victims are entitled to appeal adverse rulings on motions to assert their 
rights; and 
5. Crime victims are entitled to be heard through counsel when they attempt to 
assert their rights. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A - RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Const., art. I, § 28 - Declaration of the rights of crime victims. 
(1) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process, victims of 
crimes have these rights, as defined by law: 
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from harassment 
and abuse throughout the criminal justice process; 
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and to be heard at important 
criminal justice hearings related to the victim, either in person or through a lawful 
representative, once a criminal information or indictment charging a crime has 
been publicly filed in court; and 
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence, receive and consider, without evidentiary limitation, reliable information 
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an 
offense except that this subsection does not apply to capital cases or situations 
involving privileges. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a cause of action for 
money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or for dismissing any criminal charge, or relief 
from any criminal judgment. 
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony crimes and such other 
crimes or acts, including juvenile offenses, as the Legislature may provide. 
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce and define this section by 
statute. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 - Courts open - Redress of injuries. 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay . . . . 
Utah Const., art. VIII, § 5 - Jurisdiction of district court and other courts - Right of 
Appeal. 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by 
this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district 
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other 
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed 
originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the 
court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4 - Right to be present and to be heard 
(1) The victim of a crime shall have the right to be present at the important 
criminal or juvenile justice hearings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) through (f), 
the right to be heard at the important criminal or juvenile justice hearings provided in 
Subsections 77-38-2(5)(b), (c), (d), and (f), and, upon request to the judge hearing the 
matter, the right to be present and heard at the initial appearance of the person suspected 
of committing the conduct or criminal offense against the victim on issues relating to 
whether to release a defendant or minor and, if so, under what conditions release may 
occur. 
(5) The court shall have the right to limit any victim's statement to matters that are 
relevant to the proceeding. 
(7) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a victim's right to be heard may be 
exercised at the victim's discretion in any appropriate fashion, including an oral, written, 
audiotaped, or videotaped statement or direct or indirect information that has been 
provided to be included in any presentence report. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-11 Enforcement - Appellate review -No right to money 
damages. 
(1) If a person acting under color of state law willfully or wantonly fails to perform 
duties so that the rights in this chapter are not provided, an action for injunctive relief, 
including prospective injunctive relief, may be brought against the individual and the 
governmental entity that employs the individual. 
(2) 
(a) The victim of a crime or representative of a victim of a crime, including 
any Victims' Rights Committee as defined in Section 77-37-5 may: 
(i) bring an action for declaratory relief or for a writ of mandamus defining 
or enforcing the rights of victims and the obligations of government entities 
under this chapter; and 
(ii) petition to file an amicus brief in any court in any case affecting crime 
victims. 
(b) Adverse rulings on these actions or on a motion or request brought by a 
victim of a crime or a representative of a victim of a crime may be appealed 
under the rules governing appellate actions, provided that no appeal shall 
constitute grounds for delaying any criminal or juvenile proceeding. 
(c) An appellate court shall review all such properly presented issues, 
including issues that are capable of repetition but would otherwise evade 
review. 
(3) The failure to provide the rights in this chapter or Title 77, Chapter 37, Victims 
Rights, shall not constitute cause for a judgment against the state or any government 
entity, or any individual employed by the state or any government entity, for monetary 
damages, attorneys' fees, or the costs of exercising any rights under this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-12 Construction of this chapter -No right to set aside 
conviction, adjudication, admission, or plea - Severability clause. 
(1) All of the provisions contained in this chapter shall be construed to assist the 
victims of crime. 
(2) This chapter may not be construed as creating a basis for dismissing any 
criminal charge or delinquency petition, vacating any adjudication or conviction, 
admission or plea of guilty or no contest, or for appellate, habeas corpus, except in 
juvenile cases, or other relief from a judgment in any criminal or delinquency case. 
(3) This chapter may not be construed as creating any right of a victim to 
appointed counsel at state expense. 
(4) All of the rights contained in this chapter shall be construed to conform to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
(5) (a) In the event that any portion of this chapter is found to violate the 
Constitution of the United States, the remaining provisions of this chapter shall continue 
to operate in full force and effect. 
(b) In the event that a particular application of any portion of this chapter is found 
to violate the Constitution of the United States, all other applications shall continue to 
operate in full force and effect. 
(6) The enumeration of certain rights for crime victims in this chapter shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage other rights granted by the Utah Constitution or the 
Legislature or retained by victims of crimes. 
ADDENDUM B - TRIAL COURT'S STATEMENT AT SENTENCING HEARING 
Well, the Court has granted considerably - considerable leeway in hearing from 
Mr. Cassell without making a finding in respect to his having or lack of having standing 
in this case. 
The has also heard from the victim and the Court has been informed by the victim 
and the victim's representative, i.e., the victim's mother, that the court was not informed 
of the desire or request of the victim to be heard at the time the plea was taken. The 
Court will informally reopen the plea for the purpose of hearing that testimony, which 
I've already heard, and the Court will also accept the testimony certainly now in respect -
as it has been rendered in respect to sentencing. 
The Court finds that the prosecutor should have, does have and did in this case, 
exercise discretion in his negotiations with the defense attorney. They entered into that 
agreement with sound legal considerations that they alone basically negotiated and knew 
together and on that basis, the Court accepts and reaffirms the plea at the Class A level 
and denies any request to the contrary. 
(R. 328:45) 
ADDENDUM C - STATE PROVISIONS ON THE VICTIM'S RIGHT TO BE 
HEARD CONCERNING PLEA BARGAINS 
The following state provisions give crime victims the right to be heard concerning 
plea bargains: 
Ariz. Const., art. II, § 2.1(A)(5) ("a victim of crime has a right. . . [t]o be heard at 
any proceeding involving . . . a negotiated plea . . ."); 
Colo. Const., art. II, § 16a ("any person who is a victim of a criminal act, or such 
person's . . . legal guardian . . . , shall have the right to be heard when relevant, informed, 
and present at all critical stages of the criminal justice process"); 
Colo. Rev. Stat. 24-4.1-302.5 (victim has the "right to be heard at any court 
proceeding that involves . . . the acceptance of a negotiated plea agreement...."); 
Conn. Const., art. I, § 8(crime victim has "[t]he right to object to or support any 
plea agreement entered into by the accused and the prosecution and to make a statement 
to the court prior to the acceptance by the court of the plea of guilty or nolo contendere by 
the accused"); 
Fla. Const., art. I, § 16 ("Victims of crime or their lawful representatives . . . are 
entitled to the right. . . to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal 
proceedings . . . ."); 
Ga. Code. Ann. § 17-10-1.1 (2001) ("A victim impact statement submitted by a 
victim shall be attached to the case file and may be used by the . . . judge during any stage 
of the proceedings against the defendant involving . . . plea bargaining . . . . " ) ; 
Idaho Const., art. I, § 22(6) (crime victims have the right "[t]o be heard, upon 
request, at all criminal justice proceedings considering a plea of guilty . . . ."); 
Ind. Code. § 35-35-3-2 (before making a recommendation that charge be dropped 
as part of plea, the prosecutor must "(1) inform the victim that he has entered into 
discussions with defense counsel or the court concerning a recommendation;(2) inform 
the victim of the contents of the recommendation before it is filed; and (3) notify the 
victim that the victim is entitled to be present and may address the court (in person or in 
writing) when the court considers the recommendation"); 
Maine St. T. 15 § 6101(2) ("Whenever practicable, the attorney for the State shall 
make a good faith effort to inform the court about the following: A. If there is a plea 
agreement, the victim's or the victim's family's position on the plea agreement"); 
Minn. Stat. § 611A.037(2) ("The officer conducting a presentence or 
predispositional investigation shall make reasonable and good faith efforts to assure that 
the victim of that crime is provided with the following information by contacting the 
victim or assuring that another public or private agency has contacted the victim: . . . (iv) 
the victim's right to object in writing to the court, prior to the time of sentencing or 
juvenile court disposition, to the proposed sentence or juvenile dispositional alternative, 
or to the terms of the proposed plea agreement"); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-43-33 ("The victim has the right to present an impact 
statement or information that concerns the criminal offense or the sentence during any 
entry of a plea of guilty, sentencing or restitution proceeding."); 
Mo. Cost., art. I, § 32 (crime victims have "the right to be . . . heard at guilty 
pleas); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-M:8-k (crime victim has "[t]he right to appear and make 
a written or oral victim impact statement. . ., in the case of a plea bargain, prior to any 
plea bargain agreement"); 
N.Y. Exec. Law § 647 ('The court shall consider the views of the victim of a 
violent felony offense . . . regarding discretionary decisions relating to the criminal case, 
including, but not limited to, plea agreements"); 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-28-4.1 ('Trior to acceptance by the court of a plea 
negotiation . . . the victim of the criminal offense shall, upon request, be afforded the 
opportunity to address the court regarding the impact which the defendant's criminal 
conduct has had upon the victim"); 
S.C. Const., art. I, § 24(5) (victims of crime have the right to "be heard at any 
proceeding involving a . . . plea . . . . " ) ; 
S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-7-9 ("The prosecuting attorney shall disclose on the 
record any comments on the plea agreement made by the victim, or his designee, of the 
defendant's crime to the prosecuting attorney."); 
Texas. Code Crim. Pro. 26.13 ("Before accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo 
contendere, the court shall inquire as to whether a victim impact statement has been 
returned to the attorney representing the state and ask for a copy of the statement if one 
has been returned.").1 
1
 In addition, all states give crime victims the right to be heard at sentencing. 
Douglas E. Beloof, Victims in Criminal Procedure 621 (1999). The right to be heard at 
sentencing may well include the right to object to a plea. See, e.g., People v. Stringham, 
206 Cal.App.3d 184, 198, 253, Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. App. 1988) (victim fully entitled to 
"attack a plea bargain" and trial court acted properly in setting aside plea based on that 
attack). 
ADDENDUM D - STATE PROVISIONS AND DECISIONS ESTABLISHING A 
PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD FOR APPROVAL OF PLEAS 
The following state provisions and decisions establish a public interest standard for 
approval of plea bargains: 
People v. Yu, 143 Cal.App.3d 358, 372 (2d Dist. Div.2 1983) (finding trial court 
properly exercised discretion to reject plea bargain "which it considers not to be in the 
public interest"); 
Colo. R. Crim. P. 11(f)(5) (2001) (stating that despite existence of "plea agreement 
between the district attorney and defense counsel or defendant, the judge in every case 
should exercise an independent judgment in deciding whether to grant charge and 
sentence concessions"); 
Blinken v. State, 435 A.2d 86, 91 (Md. 1981) (in reviewing proposed plea, trial 
court must determine "whether the agreement is one which punishes the defendant for his 
act as well as satisfies the public interest that justice not be thwarted"); 
Minn. R. Crim. P 15.04 §3 (2) (2000) (stating that trial court "may accept a plea 
agreement of the parties when the interest of the public in the effective administration of 
justice would thereby be served"); 
State v. Pew, 590 N.W.2d 319, 324-25 (Minn. 1999) (finding trial court properly 
exercised statutory discretion to reject guilty plea in consideration of the public interest 
where substantial evidence of defendant's guilt undermined prosecution's argument that 
plea was beneficial to avoid possible acquittal at trial); 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.432 (1999) (prohibiting trial court from participating in plea 
discussions except to inquire of district attorney as to victim's opinion as mandated by § 
135.406(b)); 
State v. Williams, 851 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no abuse of 
discretion in trial court's refusal to accept guilty plea where trial court had discretion to 
reflect plea upon determination that it was not "helpful in the administration of justice 
and . . . in the best interest of the public."); 
Cruz v. Texas, 530 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (finding trial court's 
refusal to accept plea bargain not abuse of discretion because of trial court's function to 
"serve as a check upon . . . bargains [which are] not in the public interest"); 
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.450(2)(c) (2000) (noting that sometimes plea agreement 
where defendant does not fully describe criminal conduct may serve public interest, such 
as where victim supports plea agreement); Id. at § 9.94A.090(1) (2000) (requiring trial 
court to consider victim's wishes and "interests of justice and . . . the prosecuting 
standards" when considering a plea agreement); 
State v. Terrill, 625 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Wise. App. 2001) (in considering proposed 
plea, trial court should consider "not only the benefit to the public in securing a prompt 
disposition of the case, but also the importance of a disposition that furnishes the public 
adequate protection and does not depreciate the seriousness of the offense or promote 
disrespect for the law"). 
